The main challenge at present in constructing hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) is to solve the trade-off between private-key size and ciphertext size. At least one private-key size or ciphertext size in the existing schemes must rely on the hierarchy depth. In this letter, a new hierarchical computing technique is introduced to HIBE. Unlike others, the proposed scheme, which consists of only two group elements, achieves constant-size private keys. In addition, the ciphertext consists of just three group elements, regardless of the hierarchy depth. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first efficient scheme where both ciphertexts and private keys achieve O(1)-size, which is the best trade-off between privatekey size and ciphertext size at present. We also give the security proof in the selective-identity model. However, it is undesirable for a large network because the single PKG becomes a bottleneck: (i) private-key generation is computationally expensive, (ii) the single PKG must verify proofs of identities, and (iii) the single PKG must establish secure channels to transmit private keys. Hence, a hierarchical structure for IBE is needed. Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) is a generalization of IBE. It allows a root PKG to distribute the workload by delegating private-key generation and identity authentication to lower-level PKGs. In a HIBE scheme, a root PKG needs only to generate private keys for domain-level PKGs, which in turn generates private keys for users in their domains in the next level. Authentication and private-key transmission can be done locally. Another advantage of HIBE schemes is damage control as disclosure of domain PKG secrets do not compromise the secrets of higher-level PKGs.
I. Introduction
Identity-based encryption (IBE), introduced by Shamir [1] , allows for a party to encrypt a message using the recipient's identity as a public key. The ability to use identities as public keys eliminates the need for certificates as used in a traditional public-key infrastructure. The first efficient IBE was provided in [2] . Although the advantages of IBE are compelling, having a single private-key generator (PKG) would completely eliminate online lookup of public keys or public parameters.
delegate the key to a child, the parent creates a new lattice L 0 derived from L and uses B to generate a random short basis for this lattice L 0 . In all previous constructions, the dimension of the child lattice L 0 is larger than the dimension of the parent lattice L. As a result, private keys or ciphertexts become longer as one descends into the hierarchy.
However, the drawbacks of the previous works are obvious. In [7] - [11] , [13] - [18] , the private keys all depend on the hierarchy and maximum hierarchy. In [7] , [13] , [17] , [18] , the ciphertexts also depend on hierarchy or maximum hierarchy. These drawbacks directly increase the computation cost of the senders and storage cost of the users.
As a natural extension of the efforts to improve schemes, we present a new efficient HIBE. As a new technique, we change the master private keys to two parts: main master private keys and shared private keys created by the PKGs. It results a new construction which is different from the previous schemes. The ciphertext size as well as the private-key size is independent of the hierarchy depth. Ciphertexts in our system are always just three group elements, and decryption requires two bilinear pairing. Private keys in our scheme only contain two group elements. It is a desirable feature since it is the first scheme whose private keys and ciphertexts achieve O(1)-size. However, our scheme only achieves selective-identity security, which is a weak security for identity-based cryptography.
II. Preliminaries

Selective-Identity Security Model
The selective-identity security model for HIBE (chosen plaintext secure (IND-sID-CPA)) is defined as the following game between an adversary and a simulator.
Init. The adversary outputs an identity challenge ID * . Setup. The simulator sets up the HIBE protocol and provides the public parameters to the adversary and keeps the master key to itself. Phase 1. The adversary issues queries q 1 ,…, q m where each query q i is one of the following:
-Private-key query. The adversary issues a private-key query for ID i where ID i ≠ ID * , and ID i is not a prefix of ID * . The simulator responds by running algorithm Key Generation to generate the private key d i corresponding to the public key ID i . It sends d i to the adversary.
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts, M 0 and M 1 , on which it wishes to be challenged. The simulator picks a random bit b∈{0, 1} and sets the challenge ciphertext to C=Encryption(param, ID * , M b ). It sends C as the challenge to adversary. Phase 2. The adversary issues additional queries as phase 1 with constraint ID i ≠ ID * , and ID i is not a prefix of ID * .
Guess. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b′∈{0, 1} and wins if b = b′.
Decisional BDH Exponent Problem (n+1-BDHE).
Given a tuple (g, y 0 , y 1 ,…, y n , y n+2 ,…, y 2n+2 , T), where i i y g α = and y 0 = g c , decide 1 ( , ) n c T e g g α + = or random in G 1 . The (t, ε)-decisional n+1-BDHE assumption holds if no t-time algorithm has a non-negligible advantage ε in solving the above game.
III. New Construction
Our Scheme
Let G be a group of prime order p, g be a random generator of G, and l denote the maximum depth of HIBE.
Setup. Pick 1 1 , , , , , ,
The public key is PK={g, g 1 , g 2 }. The master key is 2 . g α At hierarchy depth i, PKG i is given the shared master key
Key Generation.
For the first level ID=(v 1 ) with 1
i n where h 10 =g. Then, the private key for ID is generated by
by using the parent (k−1)th level ID = ( 1 1 , , k v v − ) and the corresponding private key 0 1 ( , )
PKG i first generates the auxiliary information parameters as follows. Let
The private key for ID is
Let M be an encrypted message. Then, the ciphertexts can be computed by
Decryption. Let C be valid ciphertexts. Then, the message M can be recovered by the private key d ID =(d 0 , d 1 ) as follows: 
Efficiency
Based on the new technique, the private keys in our scheme achieve O(1)-size. However, in previous HIBE systems, private-key size depends on the identity depth. In addition, the ciphertext of the proposed scheme contains only 3 elements, and decryption takes only 2 pairings. It is worth noting that e(g 1 , g 2 ) used for encryption can be precomputed. Hence, encryption does not require any pairings. Table 1 gives the comparison between our scheme and the available. In Table 1 , k denotes the hierarchy depth, , k l ≤ and pk is the private key.
Security Analysis
Theorem. Suppose the decisional n+1-BDHE assumption holds in G, then the proposed scheme is secure in the selectiveidentity model.
Proof. Assume that there is an adversary A that breaks the proposed scheme with advantage ε. We show how to build an adversary B that solves the decisional n+1-BDHE problem with advantage 2 . Setup. To generate the system parameters, B sets g 1 =y 1 . Then, it selects randomly , , where 1 ,1 . ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ i l j n The master key is set as 2 g α . For any level i, the master keys Msk i are set as 
The public key is PK={g, g 1 , g 2 }.
Finally, B sends the PK to A. The corresponding master keys are unknown to B. Phase 1. The adversary A issues up to q s private-key queries. Each query q i is described as follows. Let
denote the corresponding identity. The restriction is that ID is not ID * or a prefix of ID * . This restriction shows that there exists a j such that * j j v v ≠ . To respond the query, B first derives the auxiliary information parameters as
Then, all auxiliary information parameters can be obtained.
Next, B first generates the private keys for
To simplify, we suppose that t denotes the number of positions such that * .
Then, one can obtain
, , , , . In fact, one can verify the following holds: 
B picks a random bit b∈{0, 1} and responds with the challenge ciphertext for ID * in the following manner: On the other hand, when T is uniform, C * is independent of b in the adversary's view. Note that from the received inputs, A gets no information at all about the ID * chosen by B, thus such a choice will be identical to the challenge identity with probability 1 2 kn .
Phase 2.
A continues to issue queries as phase 1. B responds as before.
Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess {0,1} b′ ∈ . B concludes its own game by outputting a guess as follows. If b=b′, then B outputs 1 meaning 1 ( , ) . α + = n c T e g g Otherwise, it outputs 0 meaning T is random in G 1 .
Therefore, if A breaks the proposed scheme with advantage ε, B solves the decisional n+1-BDHE problem with advantage 2 . kn ε
IV. Conclusion
In this letter, we introduced a new method to construct HIBE. Our new scheme achieves constant-size private keys and ciphertexts, which is the best trade-off at present. Unfortunately, our scheme only achieves selective-identity security. A natural question left open by this letter is to construct a HIBE system that is secure under a more standard assumption or achieves a stronger security notion.
